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HABEAS DATA: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERVENTIONS FROM LATIN AMERICA AGAINST
NEOLIBERAL STATES OF INSECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE
MARC-TIZOC GONZÁLEZ*
[S]hall the recent history of the [Global] South become the imminent
fate of the [Global] North? –The Critical Global Classroom (2004)1

INTRODUCTION
Habeas data is an extraordinary constitutional writ, unknown to many
in the United States but featured in numerous late twentieth century Latin
American constitutions.2 Conceptualized, designed, ratified, and implemented by diverse peoples of different nation-states who shared the common fate of having survived decades of torture, terror, and other repressive
practices under military juntas and other fascist regimes,3 the writ of habeas data responded distinctively to these recent histories by providing individuals with fundamental rights to access personal information collected by

03/25/2015 13:32:44

641

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 149 Side A

* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida. I thank
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Nathenson, Ángel R. Oquendo, Jay Sterling Silver, Francisco Valdes, Sheila I. Velez Martínez, and
Siegfried Wiessner for their helpful suggestions, as well as the editors of the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
To correspond with the author, email mtgonzalez@stu.edu or tweet @marctizoc.
1. LATCRIT, INC. & THE UNIV. OF BALT. SCH. OF LAW, THE CRITICAL GLOBAL CLASSROOM
(2004), available at
http://biblioteca.uprrp.edu/latcritcd/studentprograms/cgc/cgc2004/cgc_poster_2004.pdf.
2. E.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5 (1988) (Braz.). See also Art. 43,
CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [Const. Nac.] (1994) (Arg.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [Constitution] art. 130, 131 (2009) (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 15 (1991) (Colom.); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA DEL 26 DE ENERO DE 2010 [Constitution] art. 70
(Dom. Rep.); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [Constitution] art. 92 (Ecuador);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA [Constitution] art. 30, 31 (1985) (Guat.);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PARAGUAY [Constitution] art. 135 (1992) (Para);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ DE 1993 [Constitution] art. 2(5), 200(3) (Peru); CONSTITUCIÓN DE
LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [Constitution] art. 28 (1999) (Venez.). See generally
ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 350, 386–415, 1077–97 (2d ed. 2011).
3. See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 72–143
(2007); PETER KORNBLUH, THE PINOCHET FILE: A DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER ON ATROCITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY passim (2d ed. 2013). See generally JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A
HISTORY OF LATINOS IN AMERICA (rev. ed. 2011). For my use of the term “fascist regimes,” see Rachel
Anderson, Marc-Tizoc González & Stephen Lee, Toward a New Student Insurgency: A Critical Epistolary, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1941–46 (“Democracy and Fascism (Marc-Tizoc’s Third Letter)”).
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the state (and sometimes by private agencies of a public nature) and to
challenge and correct such data, requiring the state to safeguard the privacy
and accuracy of people’s personal data.4
By such means, among others (e.g., truth and reconciliation processes
and other extraordinary constitutional writs like amparo and similar writs
of protection),5 diverse Latin American peoples sought to recover their
societies from those, often military officers and members of the traditional
landed elite, who had disappeared, killed, tortured, and terrorized their
citizenry with impunity in the final decades of the twentieth century.6 Simultaneously, these third generation human rights were designed to safeguard the precious new democracies so that the terror of the dictatorships
would never more recur.7
Why does it feel critical to remember these histories and to understand
the constitutional remedies developed by those who reconstructed democracies in the aftermath of these regimes? Recent revelations about the technology, scale, and coordination of contemporary corporate and state
surveillance throughout and beyond the United States have opened new
opportunities to contextualize historically and to chart spatially our neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance.8
While distinctive, the rights protected by habeas data are not unique
to Latin America. Indeed, many countries and international unions, such as
Germany, the United States, and the European Union, have developed a
complex array of legal protections for data.9 Nevertheless, the terrible
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4. See ALEXANDRA RENGEL, PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 150–51, 158–60 (2013);
OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 386–415. See also Manuel Martinez-Herrera, From Habeas Data Action to
Omnibus Data Protection: The Latin American Privacy (R)Evolution, WHITE & CASE (Sept. 2011),
http://www.whitecase.com/articles-09302011/#.VM-wiUJN1FI; Data Protection: Relation between
Privacy Protection, Data Protection and Habeas Data, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW ORG. OF AMER. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/dil/data_protection_privacy_habeas_data.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
5. See KLEIN, supra note 3, at 112–13, 131–33 (discussing the truth and reconciliation reports
issued by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). See generally OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 277–386 (overviewing and discussing the writ of amparo and related writs of protection).
6. Accord KLEIN, supra note 3, at 80–143 (discussing Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay);
KORNBLUH, supra note 3, at passim (discussing Chile under Pinochet).
7. Accord KLEIN, supra note 3, at 112–13, 131–33 (discussing truth and reconciliation reports
regarding Argentina, Brazil, and Chile).
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., THE NSA REPORT: LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD (Princeton Univ. Press 2014); GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 90–169 (2014) (synthesizing the Pulitzer
Prize winning reportage conducted by himself, Laura Poitras, and others in 2013–14 on the array of
NSA surveillance programs and practices revealed by the classified documents leaked by Edward
Snowden, who accessed them while working for the NSA consulting firm, Booz Allen Hamilton, as an
infrastructure analyst).
9. See RENGEL, supra note 4, at 145–64 (discussing inter alia the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Human Rights Comm., General
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twentieth century histories of Latin America constitute compelling sociolegal reasons for evolving the venerable writ of habeas corpus into the
information-focused right of habeas data and for embedding habeas data
into a foundational source of national law like the United States Constitution. Without habeas data rights being recognized as fundamental by the
highest court of a jurisdiction, people may well lack effective means to
learn what information their governments have collected about them.10
Moreover, failing to constitutionalize rights like the writ of habeas data
may contribute to “a dialogic default—a failure to contest economic [and
other forms of] injustice within constitutional and political discourse.”11
In this Afterword, I offer a critical intervention into the existing discourse of Anglophone legal scholars regarding bulk metadata collection
and related programs.12 While I claim neither expertise in national security
law, nor in Internet privacy law, my conversations regarding habeas data
with legal scholars based in the United States over the past decade have
impressed on me that many scholars may be completely ignorant of this
critical evolution in constitutional protections.13 In light of the recent re-

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 150 Side A
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Comment 16 on its 23rd Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994); Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281);
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector
2002/58/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 201)).
10. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217
(2011) (discussing how U.S. federal courts’ disposition of FOIA claims at summary judgment have
almost completely eliminated FOIA trials, and arguing that FOIA trials could increase pro-transparency
outcomes).
11. Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules
of Law & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 633 (2008) (citation omitted). See also id. at
657–59 (discussing the dialogic theory of constitutional law).
12. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Elizabeth Atkins, Spying on Americans: At What Point
Does the NSA’s Collection and Searching of Metadata Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 10 WASH. J. L.
TECH. & ARTS 51 (2014); Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security
Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281 (2014); Liane Colonna, PRISM and the
European Union’s Data Protection Directive, 30 J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 222 (2013); Laura K.
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014); John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901 (2014).
13. Indeed, the only scholars who were already familiar with habeas data were experts in comparative constitutionalism, Latin American law, or intercultural human rights. I first learned about the
doctrine of habeas data when I participated in the Summer 2004 Critical Global Classroom (CGC), an
American Bar Association accredited summer study-abroad program, organized by Latina and Latino
Critical Legal Theory, Inc. in collaboration with the University of Baltimore School of Law, and subsequently while enrolled in a Berkeley Law Spring 2005 course on Latin American Law taught by Visiting Professor of Law, Ángel R. Oquendo. Cf. OQUENDO, supra note 2 (the casebook that Óquendo
published shortly after teaching the course in which I studied habeas data, related constitutional writs
of protection, and other third generation cultural and economic rights); Anderson, Gonzalez & Lee,
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portage of massive surveillance made possible by national security leakers14 and whistleblowers like inter alia Chelsea Manning and Edward
Snowden, Part II surveys several constitutional provisions for habeas data
and discusses several of the leading cases that have developed the doctrine
(primarily but not exclusively from Latin American countries).
However, I also mean for this Afterword to call upon activists, attorneys, scholars, and others who affiliate with Latina and Latino Critical
Legal (LatCrit) theory, praxis, and community (and related schools of critical outsider jurisprudence),15 to launch a collective interrogation of the
entire panoply of new properties16 (e.g., business records) and related incidents of our neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance. Part I explains
my conceptualization of “neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance”
and issues the call for collaboration to understand this aspect of the present
situation and to reform the laws that legitimatize it. Finally, the Conclusion
synthesizes my arguments and explains how they might advance LatCrit
theory, praxis, and community in the course of the next twenty years.
I. NEOLIBERAL STATES OF INSECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE
By the phrase “neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance,” I
mean to critique the political economies that demand, supply, and profit
from the programs and practices that mainstream discourse typically terms
“national security” and “state surveillance.” Over the past decade, critical
theorists, including legal scholars affiliated with various schools of critical
outsider jurisprudence, have produced a sustained critique of neoliberalism.
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 150 Side B
03/25/2015 13:32:44

supra note 3, at 1894 n.66, 1903 n.89 (mentioning my Summer 2004 enrollment in the CGC); Tayyab
Mahmud & Francisco Valdes, LatCrit Praxis @ XX: Law, Education, and Society, 90 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 361, 385, 388 (2015) (discussing the CGC).
14. Benkler explains, “I purposefully avoid the term ‘whistleblowing,’ although ‘accountability
leaks’ aim at that kind of leak, because the regulatory processes for internal whistleblowing threaten to
cabin the debate to what would be legal under the existing whistleblower protection regime.” Benkler,
supra note 12, at 285 n.24.
15. See Mahmud & Valdes, supra note 13, at passim (discussing critical outsider jurisprudence).
See also Marc-Tizoc González, Critical Ethnic Legal Histories: Unearthing the Interracial Justice of
Filipino American Agricultural Labor Organizing, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 991, 1006–07 nn.35–39
(2013) (citing to numerous exemplars of Asian American Legal Scholarship, Critical Race Feminism,
Critical Race Theory, and Latina & Latino Critical Legal (LatCrit) Theory). See generally Athena D.
Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship,
84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (2006); LATCRIT, http://www.latcrit.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
16. For the foundational articulation of the theory of “the new property,” see Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734–37 (1964) (theorizing property interests from what Reich
called the imperial distribution of government largesse, such as government income and benefits,
government jobs, occupational licenses, government-mediated franchises ranging from taxi medallions
to television channels, government contracts and subsidies, use of public resources, government services, etc.).

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 151 Side A

03/25/2015 13:32:44

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/24/2015 12:23 PM

AFTERWORD – HABEAS DATA

645

For example, David Harvey defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,
free markets, and free trade.”17 Similarly, Martha McCluskey characterizes
neoliberalism as “the core of law-and-economics theory, [which] establishes economic efficiency—represented by the ‘free market’—as the primary
route to public well-being.”18 Tayyab Mahmud adds:
Neoliberalism makes increasing recourse to the law to displace Keynesian welfare states through liberalization, deregulation, and privatization,
and uses the discipline of expanded markets to remove barriers to accumulation that earlier democratic gains had achieved. To secure unfettered
rights to private property and profits, it expands and deepens the logic of
the market, undermines state sovereignty and national autonomy, and
links local and global political economies to facilitate transnational accumulation of capital.19

Despite the consensus of these scholars, however, journalist Naomi
Klein makes the important observation that:
the ideology is a shape-shifter, forever changing its name and switching
identities. [Milton] Friedman called himself a “liberal,” but his U.S. followers, who associated liberals with high taxes and hippies, tended to
identify as “conservatives,” “classical economists,” “free-marketers,”
and, later as believers in “Reaganomics” or “laissez-faire.” In most of the
world, their orthodoxy is known as “neoliberalism,” but it is often called
“free trade” or simply “globalization.”20

Klein continues:

Thus, by “neoliberal,” I include the theories, individuals, and institutions that promulgate self-justificatory views of putatively “free markets”
in order to reshape societies by profiting “efficiently” from the new markets that they create in part through sustained political projects to dismantle
twentieth century social welfare states in the United States and abroad.

03/25/2015 13:32:44

17. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005).
18. Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack
on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 784–85 (2003) (citation omitted).
19. Tayyab Mahmud, Is It Greek or Déjà Vu All Over Again?: Neoliberalism and Winners and
Losers of International Debt Crises, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 661 (2011) (citations omitted).
20. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 17.
21. Id. at 18.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 151 Side A

Only since the mid-nineties has the intellectual movement, led by the
right-wing think tanks with which Friedman had long associations—
Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute and the American Enterprise Institute—called itself ‘neo-conservative,’ a world view that has harnessed
the full force of the U.S. military machine in the service of a corporate
agenda.21
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According to Klein, Brazil in 1964, Indonesia in 1965, and Chile in 1973,
were some of the first laboratories for neoliberalism, and in each case, the
imposition of neoliberal policies involved military force, namely, coup
d’état, with covert United States support.22 Moreover, as Klein extensively
documents in case studies ranging from Brazil in the 1960s to Iraq in the
2000s, the effect of imposing neoliberal policies under military force has
consistently produced remarkable profits for certain members of the power
elite,23 while impoverishing and immiserating substantial segments of their
societies.
Focusing on Latin America, consider for example that after the successful September 11, 1973, coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende, the imposition of neoliberalism immediately brought huge profits to
“foreign companies and a small clique of financiers known as the ‘piranhas,’ who were making a killing on speculation” while doubling Chilean
inflation and devastating its manufacturing industries.24 Also, after the
1976 coup against Argentinean President Isabel Perón, the junta’s first
minister of the economy dismantled workers’ rights, lifted price controls,
authorized foreign ownership of property, and liquidated hundreds of state
companies.25 Consequently, “within a year, wages lost 40 percent of their
value, factories closed, [and] poverty spiraled.”26 Similarly, in 1985 in Bolivia, in an important evolution of what Klein calls “the shock doctrine,”
the newly elected president appointed “a top-secret emergency economic
team charged with radically restructuring the economy.”27 Developing the
plan covertly (e.g., informing only two members of the cabinet), the new
Bolivian government quickly moved to radically overhaul the national
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 151 Side B
03/25/2015 13:32:44

22. Id. at 80–87 (discussing the United States support for the coups in Brazil, Indonesia, and
Chile). Accord JOHN DINGES, THE CONDOR YEARS: HOW PINOCHET AND HIS ALLIES BROUGHT
TERRORISM TO THREE CONTINENTS 3–5 (2004) (discussing declassified government documents showing that the United States Central Intelligence Agency organized an attempted military coup against
Chilean president Salvador Allende in 1970, which failed, and that within months of its creation the
CIA knew of the creation of “Operation Condor,” a secret international alliance between Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to track down alleged terrorists and subversives across
borders to return them to their countries of origin and/or to assassinate them); KORNBLUH, supra note 3,
at passim.
23. Compare C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3–4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (“The power
elite is composed of men [sic] whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of
ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. . . . For
they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society.”), with Kerry A.
Dolan & Luisa Kroll, Inside the 2014 Forbes 400: Facts and Figures about America’s Wealthiest,
FORBES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/.
24. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 97–98.
25. Id. at 108.
26. Id. at 109.
27. Id. at 182.
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economy, cancelling price controls, cutting deeply into government spending, downsizing state companies, eliminating food subsidies, tripling the
price of oil, freezing government wages, and opening the borders to unrestricted imports.28 Consequently, unemployment increased significantly,
real wages dropped dramatically, and “a small elite grew far wealthier
while large portions of what had been the working class were discarded
from the economy altogether and turned into surplus people.”29
Returning to the larger point of explaining the phrase, “neoliberal
states of insecurity and surveillance,” it seems critical to question the putative nation-state in the twenty-first century and to highlight the troubling
emergence of a globalizing “market-state.”30 As Francisco Valdes and Sumi Cho explain the concept:
We use the term here to refer to the rise of global neoliberalism and market imperatives, and the decline of the traditional nation-state and liberal
Keynesian policies with accompanying social safety nets, but view these
shifting ascendancies as tied to a larger world economic system.31

Thus, instead of the conventional terms, “national security” and “state
surveillance,” I suggest using the phrase “neoliberal states of insecurity and
surveillance” to highlight the complicity between people in nominally public and private spheres, who might never act in perfect congruence but nevertheless together serve the interests of the power elite.32 In particular, I
mean for the phrase to inflect critiques of putatively state surveillance with

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 152 Side A
03/25/2015 13:32:44

28. Id. at 183.
29. Id. at 186–87.
30. See Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice in the
Wake of Global Neoliberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1513, 1519 n.6 (2011) (discussing the intellectual
history of the market-state concept). Accord PASQUALE, supra note 12, at 10 (“We are increasingly
ruled by . . . ‘The Blob,’ a shadowy network of actors who mobilize money and media for private gain,
whether acting officially on behalf of business or of government. . . . But a market-state increasingly
dedicated to the advantages of speed and stealth crowds out even the most basic efforts to make these
choices fairer.”); Mahmud, supra note 19, at 663 (“The neoliberal project is to turn the ‘nation-state’
into a ‘market-state . . . .”) (citation omitted).
31. Valdes & Cho, supra note 30, at 1519 n.6 (citations omitted).
32. See MILLS, supra note 23, at 4 (“The power elite are not solitary rulers. Advisers and consultants, spokesmen and opinion-makers are often the captains of their higher thought and decision. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle levels of power, in the Congress,
and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper classes of town and city and region.”). See also PASQUALE, supra note 12, at 154–55 (“Private data brokers gladly serve as ‘big brother’s little helpers.’ . . . [T]he NSA is only one part of the larger story of intelligence gathering in the
United States, which involves over 1,000 agencies and nearly 2,000 private companies.”); JEAN
STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND
FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA’S FUTURE passim (1996).
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the effects of neoliberalism on the supermajority of people living within
and outside of the United States, namely, social insecurity.33
As Löic Wacquant explains it, the end of the twentieth century heralded a “new government of social insecurity” in the United States, as workers
were “caught up in the turbulence of economic deregulation and the conversion of welfare into a springboard toward precarious employment . . . during the period from 1973 to 1996, in the wake of the social,
radical, and antistatist reaction to the progressive movements of the preceding decade . . . .”34 Under Wacquant’s analysis, the United States expanded
and innovated the criminalization of poverty while “anchor[ing] precarious
wage work as a new norm of citizenship at the bottom of the class structure . . . .”35 Wacquant terms the resulting social structure, “a carceralassistential net that aims either to render [marginal populations] ‘useful’ by
steering them onto the track of deskilled employment . . . or to warehouse
them out of reach in the devastated core of the urban ‘Black Belt’ or in the
penitentiaries . . . .”36 In his view, social policy and penal policy “already
function in tandem at the bottom of the structure of classes and places.”37
For example, “the fight against street delinquency now serves as a screen
and counterpart to the new social question, namely the generalization of
insecure wage work . . . .”38 While this Afterword cannot develop
Wacquant’s theorization fully, it should suffice to conclude this discussion
by noting his use of Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “the ‘Left hand’ and the
‘Right hand’ of the state.”39 As Wacquant explains:

To his list of “the police, the courts, and the prison as core constituents of
the ‘Right hand’ of the state, alongside the ministries of the economy and

03/25/2015 13:32:44

33. Accord Mahmud & Valdes, supra note 13, at 377–80 (discussing the distribution of the gains
and costs of neoliberalism as a successful strategy of the wealth-owning classes). See generally LOÏC
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009).
34. WACQUANT, supra note 33, at 11 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 289.
40. Id.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 152 Side B

The Left hand, the feminine side of Leviathan, is materialized by the
“spendthrift” ministries in charge of “social functions”—public education, health, housing, welfare, and labor law—which offer protection and
succor to the social categories shorn of economic and cultural capital.
The Right hand, the masculine side, is charged with enforcing the new
economic discipline via budget cuts, fiscal incentives, and economic deregulation.40
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the budget,”41 I would add the various governmental intelligence agencies
that rely in part on private corporations in order to effect electronic surveillance on a truly massive and unprecedented scale in and beyond the United
States (i.e., within our neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance).
II. THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Id. (emphasis in original).
OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 350.
Id. at 386–415.
Id. at 387–415, 1077–97.
See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58–59, 83–87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
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41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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In his casebook, Latin American Law, Ángel R. Oquendo introduces
the subject of “third generation rights” by focusing on “the informational
right of habeas data.”42 He begins by excerpting relevant articles or provisions of the constitutions of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, interleaving
them with excerpts of relevant implementing statutes and judicial opinions
from those countries as well as from Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and
Peru.43 Importantly, Oquendo’s casebook translates excerpts from those
constitutions, laws, and judicial opinions into English, and its appendix
includes copies of them in their original languages (Portuguese and Spanish).44
In this Part, I discuss the writ of habeas data, drawing upon Oquendo’s treatment of the subject and emplotting the relevant constitutional
articles and provisions chronologically in order to sketch how various peoples of Latin American promulgated the writ of habeas data in Brazil
(1988), Colombia (1991), Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), and Venezuela
(1999). I then discuss several implementing statutes and judicial opinions
interpreting some of the major contours of habeas data (e.g., whether its
reach is limited to databases maintained by the government or instead may
reach putatively private databases, if they are found to be of a public nature;45 whether the writ may enable access to information that the government asserts should be restricted for reasons of security, national defense,
foreign relations, or criminal investigation;46 and whether habeas data
should be interpreted narrowly as an individual right to obtain information
about themselves only, or broadly to enable anyone to access information
without having to prove a direct relationship to the data).47 I conclude the
Part by discussing two important Puerto Rican judicial opinions, from 1988
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48. Noriega Rodríguez v. Hernández Colón, 130 P.R. Dec. 919 (P.R. 1992); Noriega v. Governador, 22 P.R. Offic. Trans. 613 (P.R. 1988). See also RAMON BOSQUE-PEREZ & JOSE JAVIER COLON
MORERA, LAS CARPETAS: PERSECUCIÓN POLÍTICA Y DERECHOS CIVILES EN PUERTO RICO passim
(1997) (discussing and presenting documents relating to Las Carpetas (the dossiers) kept by the Police
Intelligence Division of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on alleged subversives); Pedro A. Malavet,
Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L. J. 387, 419–421 (2002) (discussing legal challenges to political surveillance of alleged subversives). I thank Professor Sheila I. Velez Martínez, University of Pittsburg School of Law for informing
me about Las Carpetas and encouraging my research into them.
49. See sources cited supra notes 8 & 12.
50. While a comprehensive discussion of how United States courts could derive habeas data
rights from existing case law is beyond the scope of this Afterword, I plant the seeds of such work now
with hopes of cultivating them in a future book project that will also discuss comprehensively the

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 153 Side B

and 1992 regarding Las Carpetas, the dossiers kept by the Puerto Rican
Police Intelligence Division on alleged subversives.48
My overall intent is to sketch the contours of habeas data sufficiently
to demonstrate how it might be useful for conceptualizing a fundamental
reform of the United States law and policy that has enabled massive electronic surveillance of the sort reported by journalists like Glenn Greenwald,
Laura Poitras, and others, discussed in The NSA Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing World (NSA Report), and addressed by a growing number of legal scholars based in the United States.49 By itself habeas data
cannot end massive electronic surveillance, but grounding an expansive
version of the writ within the United States Constitution would provide a
critical check on such policies and practices. Armed with habeas data,
individuals would be better able to learn about the information being collected and kept on them under the color of law, to access such information,
and to demand its correction or deletion when its retention by the government is not justified. Further, as I explain below, habeas data rights need
not stop with databases kept by government agencies but can include databases found to be of a public nature. Thus, one version of my proposal to
amend the United States Constitution to include rights of habeas data
would express the individual’s power to transcend the state action doctrine.
Under this version, the writ would enable individuals to learn about, access,
and demand the correction or deletion of data collected and retained by
putatively private entities, upon an adequate showing that the databases are
of a public nature and hence within the purview of the informational rights
protected under habeas data. Also, while some people might find the notion of amending the United States Constitution to express new rights to
habeas data improbable or even impossible to accomplish, the Puerto Rican case of Las Carpetas shows one way that United States’ courts might
vindicate similar rights through creative and ethical application of their
common law powers of equity.50
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A. Latin American Constitutional Rights to Habeas Data
1. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988
Oquendo introduces the writ of habeas data with Article 5(LXXII) of
the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which provides:
The writ of habeas data shall be granted (a) to guarantee access to information concerning the claimant stored in the records of databases of entities of the government or of a public nature and (b) to rectify the data,
unless the claimant prefers a nonpublic proceeding, whether judicial or
administrative.51

03/25/2015 13:32:44

origins and evolution of habeas data and related Latin American constitutional writs of protection.
Marc-Tizoc González, América Posfascista (Postfascist America): Against Neoliberal States of Insecurity and Surveillance (working title).
51. OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 387 (translating CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution]
art. 5 (1988) (Braz.)). See also OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 1077 (excerpting the original Portuguese
article).
52. Id. at 387.
53. Id.
54. RENGEL, supra note 4, at 159 n.795.
55. Id.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 154 Side A

As Oquendo explains its origins, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution reacted “against the secrecy and arbitrariness with which the dictatorship
secured, kept, and utilized personal data . . . [and took] a clear position in
favor of transparency and accuracy.”52 To formulate the writ, Brazil drew
upon similar rights established by Article 35 of the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, Article 105(b) of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, the United States
Freedom of Information Act of 1974 and Freedom of Information Reform
Act of 1976, and the French Law on Information Technology and Freedom
of 1/6/1978, as well as precedents from the German Constitutional Court.53
In Privacy in the 21st Century, Alexandra Rengel adds, “The writ of habeas
data is based on the 108th Convention on Data Protection of 1981 of the
Council of Europe.”54 While the 1981 Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data did not
mention habeas data expressly, it nevertheless constituted an influential
early international legal structure to protect personal data.55
Because a comprehensive articulation of the socio-legal origins of habeas data is beyond the scope of this Afterword, I accept the premise that
Article 5(LXXII) of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution marks the beginning of
habeas data in the Global South. It is important, however, to underscore
that Brazil’s constitutional innovation relied upon critical histories, perhaps
forgotten by many (and buried by others), regarding various peoples’
struggles against repressive state surveillance and/or terror, including peo-
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ples of various European nations and the United States.56 In its original
Brazilian form, however, habeas data included two rights: first, a guarantee
to access information about a claimant that is stored “in the records or databases of entities of the government or of a public nature” and second, “to
rectify the data, unless the claimant prefers a nonpublic proceeding, whether judicial or administrative.”57 As suggested by my italicized emphasis, the
reach of Brazilian habeas data may extend beyond records or databases
owned or operated by the government to records or databases that are privately held but which are of a sufficiently “public nature” to render them
subject to the writ. However, a related provision, Article 5(XXXIII), limits
a person’s right to access governmental records, “when the society’s and
the state’s security requires secrecy.”58 Determining what databases are
adequately of a public nature, and when the state’s security requires secrecy, of course would be contested, with subsequent laws and judicial opinions refining their meaning in Brazil.59
2. The Colombian Constitution of 1991
In relevant part, Article 15 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991
provides that:
All individuals have the right to personal and family privacy and to their
good reputation, and the State has to respect them and to make others respect them. Similarly, individuals have the right to know, update, and
rectify information gathered about them in data banks and in the records
of public and private entities.
Freedom and the other guarantees approved in the Constitution will be
respected in the gathering, handling, and circulation of data.
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 154 Side B
03/25/2015 13:32:44

56. Compare Donohue, supra note 12, at 766–83 (discussing the early 1970s exposés and Congressional inquiries into “covert domestic surveillance programs directed at U.S. citizens” like the
Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence program “COINTELPRO,” multiagency watch list
program “Project MINARET,” Department of Defense telegraph interception program “Operation
SHAMROCK,” and CIA “Operation CHAOS,” which ultimately led to the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Act of 1978), with Larry Rohter, Exposing the Legacy of Operation Condor, N.Y. TIMES
LENS (Jan. 24, 2014), http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/exposing-the-legacy-of-operationcondor/ (discussing Portuguese photographer João de Carvalho Pina’s photographic book, Condor
(2014), and corresponding exhibition, which represents the legacy of Operation Condor in various Latin
American countries, and follows from his earlier book Por Teu Livre Pensamento (For Your Free
Thought) (2007), which represented the legacy of mid-twentieth century fascism in Portugal under the
regime of António de Iliveira Salazar). See also Daniel J. Wakin, Tracing the Shadows of Operation
Condor, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2010), http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/showcase-167/ (discussing Pina’s photographic book projects).
57. OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 387 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 387 n.45 (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5 (1988) (Braz.)).
59. See id. at 388–95 (excerpting a 2000 Brazilian case, Banco do Brasil v. Botelho, and discussing it in relation to Brazil’s Habeas Data Act). See also OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 1077–83 (excerpting the Botelho opinion).
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Correspondence and other forms of private communication are inviolable. They may only be intercepted or recorded pursuant to a court order,
following the formalities established by law.60

As expressed, individuals’ “right to know, update, and rectify information
gathered about them in data banks and in the records of public and private
entities” is grounded in rights to personal and familial privacy, as well as
rights to good reputation.61 Moreover, the Colombian Constitution integrates habeas data rights throughout “the gathering, handling, and circulation of data,” and the inviolacy of individuals’ “correspondence and other
forms of private communication . . . may only be intercepted or recorded
pursuant to a court order,” following legal formalities.62
In a 2002 opinion, the Constitutional Court of Colombia explained
how “the writ of habeas data evolved into a procedural mechanism to
achieve informational self-determination in a broad sense.”63 As the court
explained, “the habeas data has turned from a limited guaranty into a right
of broad scope.”64 In that case, the Constitutional Court of Colombia articulated a set of ten principles to guide the management of computer databases.65 For example, under the principle of freedom, personal data should
only be recorded and disclosed with the owner’s free, prior, and express
consent.66 Thus, the sale or transfer of personal data is prohibited.67 Under
the principle of necessity, personal data registered into a database must be
strictly necessary to fulfill the objectives associated with the database.68
Under principles of truth and integrity, providing false or erroneous information is prohibited, and information must not be partially disclosed.69
Under the principle of purpose, the collection, processing, and dissemina36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 155 Side A
03/25/2015 13:32:44

60. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 15 (1991), available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 409 (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],
septiembre 5, 2002, Expediente T-467467, Corte Constitucional, Republica de Colombia (Considerations, § 4(a)) (Colom.), available at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2002/t%2D729%2D02.htm). The case name in Spanish
is Acción de tutela instaurada por Carlos Antonio Ruiz Gómez contra el Departamento Administrativo
de Catastro (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá) y la Superintendencia Nacional de Salud.
64. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 5, 2002, Expediente T-467467,
Corte Constitucional, Republica de Colombia (Considerations, § 4(a)) (Colom.), available at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2002/t%2D729%2D02.htm. The case name in Spanish
is Acción de tutela instaurada por Carlos Antonio Ruiz Gómez contra el Departamento Administrativo
de Catastro (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá) y la Superintendencia Nacional de Salud.
65. Id. § II.4(b).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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tion of personal data should follow a clearly defined and constitutionally
legitimate purpose.70 Thus, personal data must not be collected without a
clearly articulated purpose, and personal data should not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which they were originally collected.71 The court also promulgated other rules according to principles of utiliutility, restricted circulation, inclusion, forfeiture, and individuality.72
Applying those principles, the court reversed the Labor Chamber of
the Superior Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá, which had rejected an
individual’s challenge to two governmental agencies, the Administrative
Department of the Capital District Land Registry and the National Health
Oversight Board. The plaintiff alleged that searchable online databases
published by these agencies were too easily accessible by common criminals and armed groups outside the law and thus violated his right to privacy, and put his and his family’s rights to life, personal integrity, property,
and liberty at risk.73
3. The Peruvian Constitution of 1993
In relevant part, Article 2(5) of the Peruvian Constitution of 1993 provides that:
Every person has the right to request information, without cause, and to
receive it from any public entity within the statutory period, at its respective cost, except for information affecting personal privacy, expressly
protected by law, or on national security grounds.74

Article 2(6) provides that:

03/25/2015 13:32:44

70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. §§ I.1, III.
74. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ DE 1993 [Constitution] art. 2(5) (Peru), available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2009.pdf. Cf. Oquendo, supra note 2, at 409. See
also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ DE 1993 [Constitution] art. 200(3) (Peru), available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2009.pdf (“The writ to habeas data, which operates
in case of an act or omission by any authority, official, or person, which violates or threatens the rights
referred to in Article 2, paragraphs 5, and 6 of this Constitution . . . .”).
75. Id. at art. 2(6). Also, Article 2(10) provides that:
Every person has the right . . . to the secrecy and inviolability of private communications and
documents.
Communications, telecommunications, or any private correspondence may only
be opened, seized, intercepted, or tapped by the authority of a warrant issued by
a judge and with all the guarantees provided in the law. Any matter unrelated to
the circumstances under examination shall be kept secret.
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Every person has the right to assurance that information services, whether computerized or not, either public or private, will not provide information affecting personal and family privacy.75
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As Oquendo characterizes it, “In Peru, the writ [of habeas data] has
fully expanded into a device to protect freedom of information generally.”76
As an example of the full expansion of habeas data, Oquendo discusses
and excerpts two cases that began with requests for “information on the
expenses of former [Peruvian] President Alberto Fujimori and his entourage during the 515 days that Fujimori spent abroad.”77 As the Constitutional Court of Peru explained it:
The right to informational self-determination through habeas data comprises, first, the ability to judicially demand access to databases, whether
computerized or not, whatever their nature, in which personal data may
be stored. Such access can include learning what has been recorded, for
what purpose, and who recorded the information, as well as which person(s) accessed the information.78

The court also noted that habeas data can enable an individual to update his record in order to ensure that it comprehensively and correctly
represents the person, to rectify the information, to prevent its dissemination for purposes other than those for which it was originally recorded, and
to delete such information that reasonably should not be stored.79
In the subsequent case, the court elaborated:

03/25/2015 13:32:44

Id. at art. 2(10).
76. OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 409.
77. Id. at 409–13 (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 29, 2003,
Expediente Nº 1797-2002-HD/TC (Peru), and excerpting Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], noviembre 19, 2004, Expediente Nº 0959-2004-HD/TC (Peru) (2004)). The case names are
formatted into English as Rodríguez Gutiérrez v. Paniagua Corazao and Rodríguez Gutiérrez v. Toledo
Manrique, respectively.
78. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 29, 2003, Expediente Nº 17972002-HD/TC § 4 (Peru). The case name is formatted into Rodríguez Gutiérrez v. Paniagua Corazao.
79. See id.
80. OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 412–13 (excerpting an English translation of Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 19, 2004, Expediente Nº 0959-2004-HD/TC (Peru) §§ 7, 11

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 156 Side A

The right to public information includes, additionally, the right to the
truth, which translates into the right to obtain reliable and undisputed information from administrative agencies. . . . This guaranty therefore derives from the notions of human dignity, of a democratic and social state
under the rule of law, as well as of a republican form of government. It
has a collective dimension, which consists in the nation’s right to know
the facts and events that stem from the various manifestations of state
and non-state violence. This entitlement also possesses an individual
component, which amounts to the right to ascertain the circumstances
under which human rights violations take place . . . .
From a collective point of view, the entitlement at stake amounts to the
people’s right to receive necessary and timely information so as to develop a public, free, and informed opinion. Our precedents underscore
that the access to public information is essential for democracy.80
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Accordingly, the court ordered the executive branch to provide the requested information in a timely manner, provided the petitioner paid the relevant
fee.81
4. The Argentinian Constitution of 1994
In relevant part, Article 43 of the Argentinian Constitution of 1994
provides that:
Any person may commence [a writ of protection] action to obtain personal information stored in public as well as private registries and databases and to inquire into the purpose of keeping such files. If there is any
falsehood or discrimination, the claimant may demand the suppression,
rectification, confidentiality, or updating of the data. There shall be no
violation of the secrecy of newspaper sources.82

03/25/2015 13:32:44

(2004)); see also OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 1093–97 (excerpting the original opinion in Spanish; the
case name is formatted into Rodríguez Gutiérrez v. Toledo Manrique).
81. See OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 413.
82. OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 397 (translating Art. 43, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [Const. Nac.]
(1994) (Arg.)). See also OQUENDO, supra note 2, at 1084 (excerpting the original Spanish article).
83. Id. at 398.
84. Id. at 398 (discussing Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CJSN] [National Supreme
Court of Justice], 15/10/1998, “Urteaga, Facundo R. c. Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas,” La Ley [L.L] (1998-F, 237) (Arg.)).
85. Id. at 398.
86. Id. at 398 (quoting Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CJSN] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 16/9/1999, “Ganora, Mario Fernando y otra s/ hábeas corpus,” ¶ 13 (Arg.)). In 2000, “the
Argentine legislature finally adopted Law 25326 on the ‘Protection of Personal Data.’” OQUENDO,
supra note 2, at 398 (citing Law No. 25326, Oct. 30, 2000 (Arg.)).
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According to Oquendo, “Argentines have drawn on the writ of habeas
data to secure information about individuals who ‘disappeared’ while in
the authorities’ custody during the most recent military dictatorship (1976–
1983).”83 In an important judicial opinion interpreting and applying Article
43, the Supreme Court of Argentina held that notwithstanding an implementing statute, the writ of habeas data was available not only to an immediately concerned individual but also to the brother of a deceased
person.84 Accordingly, the court ordered the state to disclose any information it possessed regarding the decedent, including the location of his
remains.85
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court of Argentina held that the
writ of habeas data could secure “personal data in the possession of the
national security forces, even if the disclosures of that information [might]
affect security, national defense, foreign relations, or a criminal investigation. The officials of the defendant institution should raise these defenses, if
at all applicable, on a case-by-case basis.”86
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5. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1999
Article 28 of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 provides that:
All individuals have a right to access information and data about themselves and about their property stored in official as well as private registries. Secondly, they are entitled to know the purpose of and the policy
behind these registries. Thirdly, they have a right to request, before a
competent tribunal, the updating, rectification, or destruction of any database that is inaccurate or that undermines their entitlements. The law
shall establish exceptions to these principles. By the same token, any
person shall have access to information that is of interest to communities
and groups. The secrecy of the sources of newspapers—and of other entities or individuals as defined by law—shall be preserved.87

03/25/2015 13:32:44

87. Id. at 396 (translating CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
[Constitution] art. 28 (1999) (Venez.)). See also id. at 1083 (excerpting the original Spanish article).
88. See id. at 396.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.; see also id. at 397 (translating CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE
VENEZUELA [Constitution] art. 58 (1999) (Venez.), and noting that it has no state action requirement).
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As Oquendo notes, Article 28 established the Venezuelan writ of habeas data, which expressly permits access to information stored in official
and private registries.88 Moreover, the Venezuelan writ of habeas data
expressly provides that individuals “are entitled to know the purpose of and
the policy behind these registries.”89 Also, it expresses a right to “updating,
rectification, or destruction of any database that is inaccurate or that undermines their entitlements.”90 Finally, Article 28 expresses that “any person shall have access to information that is of interest to communities and
groups,” and it declares that, “[t]he secrecy of the sources of newspapers—
and of other entities or individuals as defined by law—shall be preserved.”91
One could go on, either discussing additional constitutions that promulgate the writ of habeas data, or commenting in detail on subsequent legislation or judicial interpretation of the various versions of habeas data. For
purposes of this Afterword, however, while the above discussions of habeas data in the constitutions of Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Peru (1993),
Argentina (1994), and Venezuela (1999), may be relatively brief, together I
believe that they suggest a range of possibilities for amending the United
States Constitution to promulgate habeas data rights. While broad versions
of habeas data may seem improbable or even impossible to adopt today,
below, I discuss in some detail the equitable relief ordered by Puerto Rican
courts in the late 1980s to early 1990s as they considered Las Carpetas, the
dossiers kept by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Police Intelligence
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Division on alleged subversives. In my view, the cases ordering disclosure
of Las Carpetas provide persuasive authority for how United States’ courts
could organically evolve habeas data rights, grounded in their common law
powers of equity.
B. Las Carpetas: Police Dossiers on Alleged
Puerto Rican Subversives

without delay or excuses, all documents kept in their custody on the person of petitioner[,] . . . [t]o declare illegal [ultra vires] and unconstitutional the practice of keeping lists and files on persons not involved in a
[bona fide] criminal investigation[,] . . . [and] [t]o order defendants to
permanently abstain in the future from [such] practice[s.]96

In a July 20, 1987, hearing on the matter, the defendants admitted that Miranda Marchand’s name appeared in their files and promised to deliver to
him any related dossier once they had determined that it did not contain

03/25/2015 13:32:44

92. Noriega v. Governador, 22 P.R. Offic. Trans. 613, 620 (P.R. 1988).
93. Id. at 621.
94. Id.
95. In keeping with Latin America usage, I refer to individual parties by both of their surnames.
While usage may differ contingent on nationality, generally in Latin American, a person’s first surname
is paternal and the second surname is maternal. Occasionally, however, the opposite is true.
96. Noriega, 22 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 621 (bracketed additions in original).
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In Noriega v. Governador, David Noriega Rodríguez, a member of the
Puerto Rican House of Representatives, sought injunctive relief against the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, its governor, and its superintendent of police. Noriega Rodríguez sought to require the police superintendent to provide, “The list of citizens and entities classified as ‘subversives’ and who
have files or dossiers in the Police Intelligence Division” and “[t]he prevailing criteria or rules that govern the inclusion of citizens or entities in
said ‘subversive’ classification.”92 In an early ruling, the Superior Court of
Puerto Rico issued a temporary restraining order against the defendants,
enjoining them “from destroying, burning, mutilating, or altering any list of
persons classified as subversives, who have files or dossiers in the Intelligence Division of the Police of Puerto Rico.”93
In a separate claim, which was consolidated into the Noriega opinion,
“attorney Graciany Miranda Marchand sued the Superintendent of Police,
the Director of the Police Intelligence Division, and the Secretary of Justice
alleging that his name appeared on a list that the Police prepared and kept
on alleged subversives, and also that the Police had a file on him.”94 Miranda Marchand95 petitioned the court to compel the defendants to provide
him:
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confidential information; if it did, the defendants agreed to submit his dossier for the court to determine the confidentiality issue.97
The next day, however, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Rafael Hernández Colón, issued the “Executive Order of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to Create a Council for the Protection of the Privacy
Rights of Citizens and for the Security of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and to Provide the Facilities and Human Resources Necessary for
Such Purposes” (Council Executive Order).98 Citing this authority, on July
22, 1987, the defendants moved for the court to deny Noriega Rodríguez’s
request for the list of citizens and entities classified as subversives and to
stay its order concerning Miranda Marchand for a reasonable term, so that
the newly declared Council for the Protection of the Privacy Rights of Citizens and for the Security of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Council)
could be constituted, review the list, and examine the dossiers.99 Within a
week, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico held a hearing on the defendants’
motion, and issued its opinion on July 31, 1987.100
The July 31 superior court opinion is worth quoting extensively. It began by declaring:
illegal and unconstitutional the practice of keeping files, dossiers, lists,
index cards, etc., on persons, groups and organizations, solely and exclusively based on their political or ideological beliefs, absent evidence to
link these persons with the commission of or intent to commit a crime,
because it violates the freedom of speech and of association and the right
to privacy, and because it constitutes an affront to the dignity of the human being.101

Id. at 622.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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102.
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The court also declared “such practice as totally alien to our democratic
system of government,” issued a permanent injunction against the defendants “so that they cease and desist, immediately and permanently, from the
practice described,” and ordered the defendants to deliver “any and all documents” in their custody to Miranda Marchand and to “all other persons in
a similar situation” which were “kept in any dossier, file or index card,
opened solely and exclusively on the basis of said person’s political beliefs.”102
As to Miranda Marchand in particular, the court ordered the delivery
of his personal dossier within fifteen days following the date of its notice of
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Id. at 624.
See id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 625.
Id. at 626–32.
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judgment.103 As to other persons, the court reserved jurisdiction to determine a later date and mechanism of delivery in consultation with the parties
or through appointing a panel of special masters.104 As to governmental
assertions of confidentiality, the court ordered that any such documents
“shall be kept in a sealed envelope and sent immediately to this Court for
adjudication.”105 Overall, the court “strictly enjoined [the government]
from retaining a copy of the aforementioned documents, reproduced by any
of the above-mentioned means.”106 Thus, the court ordered the defendants
to furnish to individuals the date on which their file was opened, the criteria
used to open the file, and its use, if any, by the police. For example, the
Puerto Rican police must admit whether it had informed any other person,
organization, or entity that it had deemed the individual “subversive,” and
if so to provide the name of such persons or entities, as well as the date
when the police provided the data.107 Finally, the government ordered the
defendants to provide the court, within fifteen days of its order, with a “list
of the names of all persons or entities on which the Police of Puerto Rico
kept a file, which files were opened solely for political considerations,” the
number of pages in each file and its exact location, the total number of
records, files per file cabinet, and number of file cabinets.108 Toward that
end, the court also ordered the Superintendent of the Police of Puerto Rico
to safeguard all such documents, as well as any further documents regarding its surveillance policies and practices, against allegedly subversive
persons or entities, and it repealed the governor’s Council Executive Order.109
Over the next months, the matter went through several additional
rounds of motion for reconsideration and appeal until September 14, 1987,
when the Superior Court of Puerto Rico issued a judgment providing for a
comprehensive ten-part rule in order “to facilitate the delivery of the illegally kept files to the persons concerned (calculated by the Government at
74,000) . . . .”110 In turn, the governmental defendants continued appealing
the matter, attempting to avoid delivering to the court the index of the allegedly subversive people and entities on whom the police kept its secret
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111. See id. at 632–33.
112. See id. at 633–34 (discussing the Solicitor General’s arguments on appeal).
113. Id. at 634.
114. Id. at 635.
115. Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
116. Id. (citing Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 666 F. Supp. 621, 623 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)); see also id. at 635–36 (discussing inter alia Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868–69 (3d Cir. 1975)).
117. Id. at 636–638 (bracketed additions in original).
118. See id. at 639–40.
119. Id. at 640.
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dossiers.111 Less important than the precise procedural posture of the case,
for purposes of this Afterword, the central point to understand is the government’s insistence that the Council Executive Order and the Council it
would constitute should be entrusted to review Las Carpetas and to determine the procedures for their distribution to affected individuals, provided
that such files did not contain information that the government alleged to
be confidential.112
Adjudicating the matter at hand almost a year later, in its November
21, 1988, opinion, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico framed “the fundamental issue before our consideration [as determining] which are the adequate remedies to vindicate the constitutional rights of thousands of
citizens and entities, whose rights have been violated by the Government
for decades.”113 The Court elaborated, “[I]n addressing this case we must
give priority to the vindication of the constitutional rights of the 74,000
persons affected. In so doing, we must decide how would these rights be
best protected.”114 Further, the Court reflected, “[T]hat, particularly during
the last decade, the injunction in Puerto Rico has become the most effective
means to safeguard our fundamental rights. . . . [I]t ‘is the energetic arm of
justice for the protection of the citizens against the excesses of public officers who acting under the guise of authority cause irreparable injuries to
them . . . .’”115 The Court then cited to several United States federal court
opinions respecting the “equitable power to deal with records, lists, files,
and documents illegally obtained by the Government.”116 After disposing
of several other arguments raised by the government on appeal, including
trial court error for failing to certify a class action, failing to exhaust administrative remedies through the Council, and mootness,117 the Court then
reviewed the trial court’s remedy (its comprehensive ten-part rule of September 14, 1987).118
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the trial court’s September 14, 1987,
judgment, finding “no grounds to disturb the trial court’s judgment.”119 It
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reasoned that the remedy was “elaborate and detailed. It is the result of a
pondered, calm, and prudent analysis of the issue and of the viable alternatives.”120 Moreover, “the remedy does not undermine or is repugnant to the
separation of powers doctrine.”121 Instead, the Court found that, “A basic
principle would be breached if we were to allow the Council alone to design, put into effect, and determine the relief that should be afforded to
those persons whose fundamental rights the Government violated.”122 Finally, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico concluded that:
By reversing the judgment and leaving the Council alone to implement
the remedies, we would be promoting a state of mistrust and suspicion in
those 74,000 persons directly affected, and in the rest of the population
that believes in and supports a democratic government that should at all
times respect and protect the fundamental rights that underlie our social
structure. . . . This is the only way in which we can close this sordid
chapter in our collective history.123

I have detailed one of the principal cases involving Las Carpetas in
order to highlight the kinds of situations for which judicial remedies related
to habeas data have provided an effective remedy within a territory under
the jurisdiction of the United States.124 Faced with an executive branch that
had admitted to the unconstitutionality of its decades-long policies and
practices of police surveillance against alleged subversives (primarily, but
not exclusively, individuals and entities promoting the independence of
Puerto Rico from the United States),125 under Noriega v. Governador, the
Puerto Rican judiciary enjoined collecting and retaining information that
constituted Las Carpetas, constructing a comprehensive remedy by which
individuals, whom the police had deemed subversive, could obtain their
original files, with the government ordered not to retain a copy.126
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 159 Side B
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120. Id. at 639.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 639, 640 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
124. The coloniality of United States power that initially conquered and colonized, but later only
partially incorporated Puerto Rico, is beyond the scope of this Afterword. But see generally PEDRO A.
MALAVET, AMERICA’S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND PUERTO RICO (2007); EDIBERTO ROMÁN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES’ NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS (2006). On the “coloniality of power,” see Anibal Quijano,
Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America, 1 NEPANTLA: VIEWS FROM SOUTH 533 (2000).
125. Noriega, 22 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 642 (Negrón García, J., concurring); id. at 648 (Hernández
Denton, J., concurring).
126. See id at 628–31 (expressing the court’s rules for the permanent disposition of index cards
and records; creation, retention and destruction of receipts issued when individuals obtained their
original file; rules for adjudicating governmental claims regarding files containing allegedly privileged
information; and remittance to the court of unclaimed cards and records).
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Of course the story did not end there, and for purposes of this Afterword, I will comment on one additional case involving Las Carpetas,
which the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided in 1992.127 In Noriega
Rodríguez v. Hernández Colón, the Court denied the Puerto Rican government’s February 2, 1989, request for confidentiality over information contained in Las Carpetas regarding: (1) the identity of undercover agents,
confidants, informants, and other information sources, (2) the identity of
third parties whose names were included in the files, and (3) the investigative techniques.128
Prior, the Commission appointed by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico
(to which the Puerto Rican Supreme Court had remanded jurisdiction in
Noriega v. Governador) had partially approved the government’s request,
ruling in its favor on the first (identity of undercover agents, informants,
etc.) and third (investigative techniques) bases but ruling against the government as to the identity of other third parties.129 The government’s main
argument was that the court must comply with Puerto Rican Rules of Evidence 31 and 32.130 Rule 31 provided a privilege against the disclosure of
“official information,” or information “gained in confidence by a public
officer or employee in the performance of his duty,” which had neither
been officially disclosed, nor was publicly accessible until the moment in
which the privilege was invoked.131 Rule 32 provided a privilege for a public entity against disclosing:

In reversing the Commission’s ruling, which was in favor of the government’s request for confidentiality as to the identity of its agents and
informants, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico discussed the right of Puerto
Rican citizens to access information as integral to democratic selfgovernance, which should only be limited by “the most urgent public ne-

03/25/2015 13:32:44

127. Noriega Rodríguez v. Hernández Colón, 130 P.R. Dec. 919 (P.R. 1992). I thank Julio Menache for assistance translating portions of the opinion from Spanish into English. Responsibility for any
errors in translation, however, is mine alone.
128. Id. at 928.
129. See id. at 927.
130. See id. at 939–40.
131. Id. at 939.
132. Id. at 939–40.
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the identity of a person who has provided information regarding the violation of a law of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the United
States, if the information is given in confidence by the informant to a law
enforcement officer, representative of an agency responsible for the administration or enforcement of a law that was allegedly violated, or any
other person for the purpose of the transmission to such officer or representative.132
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Id. at 937.
Id. at 937–38.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 940.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 942.
See id.
Id.
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cessity.”133 The Court elaborated on the “close correspondence between the
right to free expression and freedom of information,” explaining that
“[w]ithout knowledge of facts one cannot judge them.”134 Therefore, to
prevail against the right to freedom of information, the Court required that
the government prove “the existence of compelling interests of higher rank
than the values protected by the right to freedom of information for citizens.”135
In the Court’s view, Rule 31 was not controlling because on its face
the privilege required that “official information” be acquired by an official
acting in the “performance of his duty.”136 Thus, it was inapposite “because
no official has the ‘duty’ of violating the constitutional rights of a citizen.”137 As to Rule 32, the Court underscored that it expressly required
“that the information provided by the informant be ‘aimed at discovering
the violation of a law of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the United
States of America.’”138 In contrast, except for a few cases regarding clandestine groups to which violent acts had been attributed, the government
had stipulated that the information collected by the police had nothing to do
with the commission of public offenses.139 The Court also explained why
public policy militated against the government’s position: the privilege
established by Rule 32 was intended to protect those who provide information about the commission of a crime, not to conceal those who coerce,
persecute, and restrict the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.140
Here, however, undercover police agents and informants knew that they
were investigating and monitoring people for purely ideological reasons.141
Thus, disclosing their identities would militate against the return of such
practices in the future; in contrast, granting the government’s request for
confidentiality would set a precedent that might well encourage the return
of “this nefarious practice.”142 Finally, the Court highlighted the practical
difficulty with the government’s request, namely, “[t]he process of excluding the names of undercover agents and informants would delay delivery
for years, lead to thousands of disputes, involve unjustifiable costs and,
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above all, undermine the reason for the delivery of the files.”143 As the
Court concluded, “There is no evidence or reason to believe that disclosing
the identities [of the undercover police agents and informants] would entail
risks to their lives.”144
CONCLUSION
Today, thanks to the accountability leaks made by Edward Snowden
and others, people throughout the world know that the United States government (and its putatively private corporate “little brothers”) has been
surveilling everyone it can—often without regard for individualized suspicion.145 If it seems unbelievable today that a United States court might order the disclosure of governmental records kept not merely on alleged
subversives but instead on the entire populace, Noriega v. Governador,
Noriega Rodríguez v. Hernández Colón, and related judicial opinions regarding Las Carpetas, stand as a hopeful reminder that courts can enforce a
rule of law that promotes the right to freedom of information and concomitant values of transparency and democratic self-governance. As concurring
Justice Negrón García, wrote in Noriega v. Governador:
The so-called “subversives-lists” are remoras on our democracy. They
are official access keys to subtle, direct or indirect, and indiscriminate
repression. Besides being a simple documental catalogue, in their essence, the lists and records attach a humiliating and ignominious stigma
that threatens the dignity, the privacy, and the rights of freedom of expression and of association of thousands of citizens.146

Justice Negrón García continued:

03/25/2015 13:32:44

143. Id. at 943.
144. Id. at 950 (citation omitted).
145. See GREENWALD, supra note 8, at 94 (“the literal, explicitly stated aim of the [United States]
surveillance state: to collect, store, monitor, and analyze all electronic communication by all people
around the globe.”); see id. at 95–118 (discussing several of the programs by which the NSA and other
U.S. intelligence agencies effect this goal). Accord Benkler, supra note 12, at 285–86, 300–11 (discussing accountability leaks and NSA bulk surveillance); Donohue, supra note 12, at passim (discussing the
NSA’s bulk collection of metadata).
146. Noriega v. Governador, 22 P.R. Offic. Trans. 613, 644 (P.R. 1988).
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This old practice should have never been enthroned. Although it is typical of terrifying fascism or emasculating dictatorships, it has on occasions cropped up in countries of democratic tradition. . . . In order to
achieve its total eradication, prevent it from happening again or from
catching on in new generations, it must be strongly and unanimously
condemned. It threatens the most basic civil, human, and constitutional
rights. It lends itself to persecutions, witch-hunts, and to silencing just
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claims. It is equivalent to substituting force for law, totalitarianism for
democracy.147
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147. Id. at 645 (citing FBI Kept a File on Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1988,
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/21/us/fbi-kept-a-file-on-supreme-court.html).
148. Id. at 645.
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While some commentators may not know of the terrible histories of
the Global South that engender fierce opposition to neoliberal states of
insecurity and surveillance, Justice Negrón García’s concurrence articulates
a stirring condemnation of not only Las Carpetas but all such government
policies and practices. While government officials, agents, and informants
may well cloak their practices under the color of law, in his view they impinge “on the right to dissent, the natural and irreplaceable raw material
that nurtures the roots of the tree of democracy.”148
I agree with Justice Negrón García’s understanding and believe that
amending the United States Constitution to feature a robust version of the
writ of habeas data would effect a significant change in the culture of impunity that seems to animate neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance. Indeed, since first learning about habeas data over the past decade,
while sojourning Chile, Argentina, and South Africa in LatCrit’s Critical
Global Classroom and under subsequent studying with Oquendo, I have
wrestled with how to write effectively about the critical insights that habeas data may hold for socio-legal discourse, in particular LatCrit theory,
praxis, and community.
Notwithstanding self-reservations about my ability to discuss habeas
data adequately, in this Afterword I have finally endeavored to intervene
into the discourse of predominantly United States legal scholars who write
in English, as well as to challenge critical socio-legal scholars who affiliate
with LatCrit theory, praxis, and community to learn or refresh our recollections about the terrible histories of Latin American dictatorships. We would
all do well to recall, study, and discuss not only the circumstances that gave
rise to the writ of habeas data but also to understand its variegated Latin
American jurisprudence. In order to establish violent, effective, social control, fascist dictatorships of Latin America surveilled a relatively small part
of the populace, but these regimes of terror deformed their entire societies,
often with the direct support of the United States government and to the
benefit of private corporations based in the United States. Without a next
generation right like habeas data, I fear that United States jurisprudence
will be inadequate to the task of dismantling our present neoliberal states of
insecurity and surveillance.
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149. Donohue, supra note 12, at 797–800 (discussing Congressional amendment of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1988 and 2001 to include the production of certain kinds of business
records, and the expansive collection practices authorized under the 2003 United States Attorney General guidelines).
150. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 12, at 158 (“What we need to face up to is that pervasive
surveillance, unified into massive databases by powerful corporate and government actors, is an effort
to find out ‘what makes us tick’ on a societal level.”).
151. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 12, at xxvi, 67–71 (discussing Recommendation 5).
152. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 8, at 90–169 (discussing surveillance programs conducted
by the NSA and other intelligence agencies, including those of foreign nations allied with the United
States).
153. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 12, at 766–83 (discussing such programs and their exposure by
journalism and Congressional investigation).
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Indeed, with Chelsea Manning serving her sentence in military prison,
Edward Snowden functionally exiled in Russia, Julian Assange languishing
in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, and Aaron Swartz dead by his own
hand, the rule of law colors with private corporate ownership “business
records,” and other personal data, derived from natural persons.149 At the
same time, a variety of governmental agencies in a plethora of partnerships
with such corporations conduct massive electronic surveillance on an unprecedented scale, collecting precisely those “business records” that have
been recognized by law as the property of a private corporation.150 Responding naively to such revelations, however, the NSA Report recommends that, “the storage of bulk telephony meta-data by the governgovernment . . . [should transition] as soon as is reasonably possible to a
system in which such meta-data is held instead either by private providers
or by a private third party.”151 This recommendation misunderstands the
nature of neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance. Rigorous investigative journalism has made it abundantly clear that the United States government has obtained massive amounts of personal information under
secret forms of private-public partnerships.152 Thus, now, as in the years
leading to the exposure of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program, and
related domestic surveillance programs,153 people of good will are at a
crossroads in our histories.
To pose a binary choice: will we continue acquiescing to neoliberal
states of insecurity and surveillance (a.k.a., the black box society), or will
we revolutionize the present socio-legal situation so that we may readily
access information collected and kept by various government agencies, as
well as by putatively private entities, in order to learn what they keep in our
files, for what purposes they have collected information on us, and with
concomitant rights to challenge, correct, and petition for the deletion of
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154. See PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF HOPE: RELIVING PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 2 (Robert
R. Barr trans., Continuum Publ’g Co. 2004) (discussing the need for critical hope, “based on the need
for truth as an ethical quality of the struggle”).
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such data? In other words, might people in the United States successfully
petition the government for redress in one or more of the following ways?
(1) Might existing constitutional rights be evolved through litigation
to enable individual natural persons to review and correct “business
records” and related information that the federal government has obtained?
(2) If constitutional jurisprudence is inadequate to the task, then is it
politically feasible to graft a robust version of the writ of habeas data
into the United States Constitution through an amendment?
(3) If constitutional litigation or amendment is unavailing, then might
federal or state law be litigated, or promulgated, to provide for habeas
data rights—for example, extending Freedom of Information Act
laws, or emerging litigation regarding state DNA databases, and/or the
privatization of criminal records in the employment law context?
(4) Finally, if domestic venues are unavailing, or slow, how might international human rights law and norms be deployed to lobby effectively for the creation of robust habeas data rights in the United
States?
The recent history of the Global South may well have become the future of the Global North, but if people in the United States and other parts
of the Global North educate ourselves critically in the terrible histories of
the Global South, in particular the Latin American struggles through which
diverse peoples sought to recover their societies from fascist military dictatorships, we might find cause for “critical hope” in the form of the extraordinary writ of habeas data.154 While habeas data by itself will not abolish
neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance, working together to educate
the public and struggling to demand an amendment to the United States
Constitution to express habeas data rights would be a worthwhile endeavor
for the coming decades of LatCrit theory, praxis, and community.
Con safos.
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